The Trojan Horse enforcement mechanism turns law-breakers into law-enforcers by entrusting them
INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long debated the optimal division of labor between public and private law enforcement. Pioneers in this area of scholarship were Becker and Stigler (1974) , who called for the privatization of law enforcement. According to their proposal, private agents would collect fines from outlaws on a first-tofile-collects-the-fine basis. In response, Landes and Posner (1975) pointed at certain failures from which the market for private law enforcement suffers. They also questioned the novelty of Becker and Stigler's proposal, noting that in practice the law enforcement enterprise already occupies bounty hunters, class action representatives, and other legal entrepreneurs. On that basis, Landes and Posner concluded that there is no reason to question the efficiency of the current separation of responsibilities between the public and the private sectors of law enforcement.
This paper proposes a different kind of enforcement mechanism, one that does not rely on public agencies, victims or bounty hunters. The best enforcers of the law, goes my argument, are the most informed parties, namely, the lawbreakers themselves. Thus, the mechanism I propose here entrusts to the first felon filing a civil suit the right to collect the fine from his accomplices. 1 Whereas public enforcers, in the course of investigating a case, may subject suspects to the prisoner dilemma by offering each one of them immunity for testifying against the others, the mechanism I propose here positions lawbreakers in the "conspirator dilemma" from the very moment they enter the illegal scheme. 2 Each felon faces the risk that her partner might defect, and thus each partner's best strategy will be to act as a Trojan Horse and collect the fine first. 3 Hence, unlike public and private enforcement agencies, which typically start investigating a crime only after its completion, these conspirators would sue their partners at the preliminary stages of the crime, often before any harm has been done. 4 Clearly, the Trojan Horse mechanism can operate alongside public enforcers. In such a competitive setting, in addition to collecting the fine, a felon who wins a Trojan Horse suit would be immune from government prosecution. 5 However, one advantage of the mechanism is that, unlike leniency and state witness programs, it is not dependent on effective public enforcement mechanisms operating in the background, thus allowing us to decriminalize certain offenses. 6 The following two examples demonstrate the way in which the Trojan Horse mechanism operates.
$ Example One: Price Fixing
Consider first the case of price fixing arrangements. Currently, public agencies and private entities work in tandem to enforce the antitrust laws. But both of these enforcement mechanisms are seldom privy to information about the formation and execution of anti-competitive agreements. Hence, some price-fixing arrangements escape sanctions altogether; others are detected only long after initiation, often after the cartel breaks apart.
Compared with any public or private enforcer, cartel members possess far more information about the anti-competitive nature of their conduct. The first-felon-to-file-collects-the-fine rule takes advantage of this comparative advantage. Since each member of the cartel faces the risk of being sued by the other, the best strategy for each member must be to defect first and file a suit as soon as sufficient evidence to support the case is gathered. Hence, the Trojan Horse mechanism raises significantly the cost of entering such an anti-competitive agreement.
$ Example Two: Illegal Employment
Another good example is the import and employment of illegal immigrants. A large segment of the workforce in many industrial countries consists of illegal immigrants. Typically, the laws of these countries subject illegal immigrants and their employers to significant sanctions. The fact that these fines do not deter employers from hiring illegal immigrants suggests that public enforcement is ineffective. One explanation for this enforcement failure is that enforcement agencies are uninformed. Another explanation is that enforcement agencies are captured by interest groups that persuade the public enforcement agency to keep a high profile in the media, but a low presence in the sweatshops.
Arguably, private agencies, in line with Becker and Stigler's (1974) proposal, are less influenced by interest groups and more informed than public agencies, and therefore have the potential to somewhat tighten the enforcement of these laws. But the best enforcers of these laws are probably the illegal immigrants themselves, who know their status better than any public or private enforcer does. Under my suggestion, therefore, illegal immigrants will be authorized to collect fines from their employers and/or from the manpower agent who assigned them to their employer. If the immigrant wins his or her case, the court would order the defendant to deposit the fine at the country's gate and the immigrant would collect it on his or her way out of the country. The illegal immigrant will be pressured to file such a suit, otherwise his employer will file first and the employee will lose his opportunity.
Having introduced the mechanism, we can now turn to a discussion of its details.
THE TROJAN HORSE MECHANISM IN THREE SETTINGS
In this part, I examine the way in which the Trojan Horse mechanism operates in three different contexts. In the first scenario, two (or more) conspirators engage in only one incident of law-breaking. In the second, I examine the operation of the mechanism in infinite, serial conspiracies. The third context involves an infinite conspiracy plot between an empty-pocket and a deeppocket conspirator.
The one factor I use to evaluate the efficacy of enforcement systems is the minimum fine required under each system to deter wrongdoing. The lower the fine required to attain deterrence, the more efficient is the deterrence mechanism because it can deter poorer criminals. Notice that if the financial resources of criminals were unlimited, all enforcement mechanisms could reach any level of deterrence they desire, even if their detection level were relatively low, simply by raising the fine they impose. In the real world, however, the financial resources of criminals are limited and enforcement agencies cannot collect, or threaten to collect, from criminals more than their pocket can afford. Thus, the lower the fine required by an enforcement mechanism to deter criminal activity, the more criminals would be able to pay that fine, and therefore, be deterred by that mechanism.
ONE-SHOT CONSPIRACY GAME
Consider the case of two agents, Roe and Doe, who conspire to misreport their profits to the tax authorities. Roe and Doe expect to derive from their illegal interaction a gain of $G each. The fine that the public enforcement agency imposes on each party to such a conspiracy is $F, and the probability that the plot will be detected and successfully prosecuted is P. Assuming Roe and Doe are risk neutral, they would not engage in such a scheme if the expected fine for tax evasion (PF) is higher than their expected gain (G). The minimum fine that satisfies this condition is: F*=G/P. Only criminals whose financial resources are higher than G/P will be deterred by this enforcement mechanism. Now suppose we replace the public enforcement agency with Trojan Horses; namely, lawmakers rely solely on Roe and Doe to enforce the tax laws. Again, I assume that Roe and Doe gather sufficient evidence to support such a suit only after they have completed the tax evasion plot. At that time, Roe and Doe run to court --the probability for each one of them that he will get there first and become a Trojan Horse is 50%. The probability that the Trojan Horse will prevail at trial is Q, in which case the court would order the defendant to pay a fine ($F) and would assign a portion of this fine ($R, where R,F) to the plaintiff. The rest of the fine would go to the state.
The 2*2 table below presents the dilemma the two conspirators face immediately after they have executed their commitments under the agreement: 
The Conspirator Dilemma / 29 DOI: 10.2202 DOI: 10. /1555 DOI: 10. -5879.1050 Clearly, in the absence of public enforcement in the background, it is Pareto optimal for Roe and Doe to evade the tax laws and to refrain from suing one another. However, as long as the expected reward (QR) is positive, 7 the Trojan Horse mechanism induces the two conspirators to race to the courthouse as soon as the illegal scheme has culminated. Knowing in advance --i.e., before commencing the scheme --that eventually the conspirators will race each other to the courthouse, the two will not engage in the scheme only if their expected gain is negative, namely if G+Q(R-F)/2<0. 8 Solving for the minimum fine and reward that would deter participation in the scheme, we find that: F*=2G/Q and R*-0. The difference between the fine the defendant pays (F*) and the reward of the plaintiff (R*), should go to a third party, e.g., the government.
The most interesting conclusion we may derive from the above matrix is that the minimum fine that would persuade Roe and Doe out of their plan to evade the tax laws, is not negligible. In fact, assuming the probabilities of detection by public authorities and by Trojan Horses are the same, namely P=Q, the minimum fine of the Trojan Horse mechanism (F=2G/Q) is twice the minimum fine required by the public authorities (F=G/P). Thus, the public enforcement and the Trojan Horse systems will be equally effective only if the probability of the Trojan Horse prevailing at trial is twice the probability of the tax authorities detecting and successfully prosecuting the evasion. The intuition lying behind this result is quite simple: When the public enforcement mechanism is at play, the two conspirators are forced to pay the fine to the government. When, on the other hand, Trojan Horses are the only enforcers of the law, one conspirator is let off the hook and gets to keep his ill-gotten gains to himself --the fine, therefore, should be higher.
Although this comparison seems to favor the public agencies, it does not suggest that Trojan Horses are inferior enforcers. Conspirators, by definition, always detect and, arguably, have superior, almost costless access to evidence concerning the crime they commit. Thus, it might be reasonable to assume that the probability a Trojan Horse would prevail at trial is more than twice the probability a public enforcer would detect a crime and win the trial. Moreover, the overall cost of the enforcement would be lower than the costs a public agency would have to invest.
Another consideration we should take into account is that the effectiveness of the mechanism improves with the number of conspirators who participate in the illegal scheme. The intuition here is also simple: when two agents conspire and are subject to the threat of a Trojan Horse suit, each one of them anticipates a 50% probability he will file the suit first and will get to keep his illgotten gains. As the number of conspirators increases to N, the probability of filing first goes down to 1/N and only one of the N conspirators would get to keep his gains. Thus, it can be shown that if N agents engage in a conspiracy, the minimum fine that would attain deterrence is: F*=NG/(N-1)Q. Based on the above conditions, we may conclude that the larger the number of conspirators, the more effective the enforcement mechanism. Consequently, with the Trojan Horse mechanism in the background, criminals would prefer to act in concert with a smaller number of players because as the number of conspirators increases they face a higher risk of defection.
INFINITE CONSPIRACY GAMES
In the one-shot game discussed above, the parties knew from the outset that the day would come when the scheme would end and both would face the existential dilemma of whether "to sue or not to sue." In infinite schemes, on the other hand, conspirators face a different dilemma: to sue or to continue with the scheme. 9 In an "ideal" infinite scheme, the parties anticipate when they launch the scheme that at each point of time in the future the net present value of their scheme would be positive. Consider first the following simple case: Roe and Doe establish an offshore business for the purpose of illegally evading the tax laws of the country. At the time they establish this business they anticipate that their scheme would operate forever and their gains from tax evasion would be $g per year. Since they anticipate an interest rate of r% per year, the present value of the stream of dividends they expect to receive from their crime is G=g/r. In addition, they predict that the probability that the IRS will detect them is P, and that in the case of such an unfavorable event they will be forced to pay a fine of $F. Thus, the net present value of their crime is NPV=G-PF. This scheme would be considered infinite only if the parties foresee that at each point of time in the future the net present value of the scheme would be positive, namely if G>PF. For example, if the two conspirators believe that the probability that the IRS will detect them increases (or that their gains decrease) with time in a way that would force them to close the business in the future, this can no longer be considered an ideally infinite scheme.
The distinction between finite and infinite schemes has a very important implication for this paper, because it demonstrates a major distinction between leniency programs and the Trojan Horse mechanism. Leniency programs may have a very strong deterring effect against finite schemes, because at the very start of the scheme each conspirator knows that after the last shot of the game it will pay for each one of them to snitch on his or her partner. The one-shot game we described earlier, which is an extreme example of a finite game, has demonstrated this point very clearly by showing that a very minimal reward can motivate the law-breakers to snitch soon after the completion of the scheme. Leniency programs, however, are ineffective against infinite schemes; in such schemes, at each point of time, the present value of the stream of dividends always exceeds the expected fine, and therefore, the parties do not see any reason to end the scheme. Thus, the introduction of leniency programs contributes nothing to combatting infinite schemes.
The Trojan Horse enforcement mechanism solves the above problem. Suing the partner to the conspiracy may become a rational strategy even in infinite settings if the reward promised to the plaintiff would compensate him for waiving the benefits of the illegal scheme.
The following table presents the payoffs the parties foresee at each point of time along the infinite lifetime of the scheme: In equilibrium, both parties would rush to court soon after the first violation if (1) QR>G. Assuming the above condition is met, both conspirators know, before engaging in the first violation, that the next morning both will race to court. Hence, they would not engage in the first (or the next) incident of lawbreaking if (2) [QR-QF]/2<0. Conditions (1) and (2) entail that the two would not conspire if F>R>G/Q. 10 Comparing the conditions for an effective Trojan Horse mechanism in finite and in infinite schemes leads to the following interesting conclusions.
First, assuming both plots generate similar gains to the conspirators, the fine required for an effective Trojan Horse mechanism is lower in infinite schemes, in fact it is half the size of the fine required in one-shot schemes. The intuition behind this result is that in finite schemes like the one-shot example discussed earlier, one party gets to keep all of the ill-gotten gains. In the infinite game, both parties waive the ill-gotten gains they anticipate receiving in the future.
For the same reason, the reward should be much larger in infinite schemeswhereas the reward in one-shot schemes can be nil, and thus leniency programs may be sufficient, in infinite schemes the reward should compensate the defecting conspirator for waiving the future stream of dividends he anticipated from the plot.
ASYMMETRIC GAMES AND THE PROBLEM OF FINANCIAL INADEQUACY
Any enforcement mechanism that is based on monetary sanctions alone seems to be ineffective when utilized against judgment-proof defendants. Consider again the case of illegal employment. Economic sanctions may deter employers, but the employees' empty pockets clearly protect them from economic sanctions. It seems that the only way to discipline judgment-proof law-breakers, such as illegal immigrants, is through jail sentencing and deportation. Experience indicates, however, that the opportunity costs for judgment-proof felons are often so high that they engage in the illegal conduct even in the face of a very high risk of jail sentencing and/or deportation. Moreover, subjecting only judgment-proof defendants to physical sanctions like a jail sentence, or deportation in the case of illegal immigrants, is a very costly move for the government, mainly because of the human rights sentiments it arouses.
This brings us back to the advantages of the Trojan Horse mechanism. The argument that monetary measures do not deter illegal employees and other 10 Depoorter and De Mot (2005) suggest that under the False Claims Act whistle blowers may have an incentive to delay filing because their rewards are a function of the harm the fraud causes. As shown here, the Trojan Horse's reward is a function of the conspirators' anticipated gains, and therefore Trojan Horses are under pressure to file suit as early as possible.
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The following model demonstrates some of these contentions.
Consider an asymmetric game, like illegal employment, where conspirators have different levels of financial resources and they engage in the illegal conduct for the long-run, with no endgame on the horizon. For simplicity, I will assume that one party has no financial resources to pay the fine and the other is a relatively deep pocket, but still subject to some financial constraint so that we are still searching for the enforcement mechanism that would minimize the fine required to attain deterrence. I will further assume, as often is the case, that the emptypocket criminal derives $m from each incident of law-breaking and the deep-pocket derives $g, where g>m. The interest rate is still r, so that m/r=M and g/r=G are the net present value of the stream of dividends that the employee and the employer, respectively, anticipate receiving from their illegal relations.
The Trojan Horse mechanism operates very differently in this setting. If the empty-pocket sues and proves his case, the deep-pocket pays a fine of $F, a portion of which, $R (R,F), is allotted to the empty-pocket and the rest goes to the government. The deep-pocket conspirator may also sue, but only for the purpose of protecting himself from a countersuit by the empty-pocket conspirator. The probability of winning a case remains Q for both conspirators. Under this setting, the infinite game looks as follows: The empty-pocket would sue if QR>M. The deep-pocket would sue only if he knows that the empty-pocket is about to sue and only if QF>0. Now, since the fine must always be greater than or equal to the reward, we may conclude that the employer would not hire illegal immigrants if the fine and the reward would be larger than M/Q.
The gist of this result is that, despite the fact that the employee is emptypocket and does not face any financial risk, the size of the fine that would deter the conspiracy is a function of the employee's profits and not related in any way to the profits the employer derives from the scheme. This result is in sharp contrast to the fines that public enforcement agencies should impose in such cases, which are a function of the employer's gains. Thus, if filing costs for empty-pocket conspirators are low enough, the Trojan Horse mechanism would be more effective than public agencies, even if the probability of success for public enforcement is as high as that of Trojan Horses. For similar reasons, we find that the minimum fine in asymmetric schemes is lower. We may conclude, therefore, that the Trojan Horse mechanism is more effective in asymmetric schemes, namely, schemes in which one conspirator is judgment proof and the second is a deep-pocket, and the latter's profits from the scheme are higher than the former's.
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THE DUAL EFFECT OF THE TROJAN HORSE MECHANISM ON TRUST AMONG CONSPIRATORS
So far, I have assumed the gain each conspirator derives from the crime is exogenous and is not dependent on the enforcement mechanism that operates in the background. In other words, I have implicitly assumed that the enforcement mechanism affects the conspirators' decision whether to commit the crime or not, but once they commit the crime they derive $G profits, no matter what type of enforcement mechanism is in place. But, as shown below, the Trojan Horse enforcement mechanism may have two conflicting effects on the monitoring costs of the conspirators and thus on the profitability of their scheme.
The first, and most trivial effect of the Trojan Horse mechanism, is that it reduces the level of trust among conspirators. With the Trojan Horse mechanism in the background, conspirators should find a commitment mechanism that would enable them to ensure each other that they would not file a suit. Such commitment may be based on long-term relationships, family or social ties, violence and alike. Alternatively, it may force the conspirators to make sure their assets are somehow protected, so that the rewards a Trojan Horse can collect would never exceed the conspiracy profits. All these mechanisms may be costly and thus they increase the cost, or reduce the profitability of, engaging in conspiracies.
The second effect is less trivial and it operates in the opposite direction, namely, it strengthens the level of trust among conspirators and lowers their cooperation costs. To see why, one must realize that just as in any partnership, agency problems dominate the relationships between conspirators. In fact, since conspirators can hardly resort to the assistance of the legal system, agency problems are much more disastrous to the stability of illegal schemes. Surprisingly, the Trojan Horse mechanism may lower the conspirators' monitoring costs. Consider, for example, Roe and Doe, the two tax evaders. Besides the fact that the two misreport their earnings, they also have a business to run and both face the risk that the other party will not dedicate sufficient efforts to the business and thus try to free-ride on the efforts of the other party or even steal from the joint fund. With the Trojan Horse mechanism in the background, Roe knows that once Doe's profits from the plot (G) are reduced to a certain level, Doe will undertake the Trojan Horse role. Similarly, in a price-fixing arrangement each cartel member knows that if he defects and reduces prices below the agreed cartel price, his competitors will lose market share, their profits will shrink, and they will be motivated to file a Trojan Horse suit even if they know nothing about the defection (Spagnolo, 2000) . In other words, the threat of the Trojan Horse mechanism provides each conspirator an incentive to keep the other co-conspirators sufficiently "happy" and profitable so that they will not be encouraged to file a suit. To be more precise, with the Trojan Horse mechanism in the background, each conspirator wants to make sure the other's profits exceed the reward he could get from filing first, and this serves as a constraint on the ability of each conspirator to free-ride, defect, cheat or steal from the conspiracy funds. Knowing in advance that their conspiracy is more stable and that their monitoring costs are lower, criminals may find it more beneficial to engage in conspiracies.
Combining the two effects together, we may construct the following thesis: the Trojan Horse mechanism reduces monitoring costs and encourages highly profitable conspiracies, namely conspiracies in which the parties anticipate that their gains (not taking monitoring costs into account) would be significantly larger than the rewards a Trojan Horse would be able to collect. On the other hand, in less lucrative conspiracies, in which the parties anticipate a high probability that the conspiracy gains (not taking monitoring costs into account) would be lower than the rewards, the Trojan Horse mechanism would force them to invest more resources in monitoring and, therefore, it would further reduce the profitability of the scheme and discourage its operation. We may conclude, therefore, that with the Trojan Horse mechanism in the background, highly profitable conspiracies may flourish and low-profit conspiracies may vanish. Thus, a policy maker facing the dilemma of whether to adopt a Trojan Horse mechanism, should feel comfortable introducing this mechanism to relatively low-profit crimes or to conspiracies that involve low monitoring costs. At the same time, such policy makers should be careful not to introduce the Trojan Horse mechanism to high-profit conspiracies that involve large monitoring costs, because in these cases the mechanism may increase the profitability of such schemes. For example, price fixing arrangements may be very profitable, but at the same time they involve significant monitoring costs. In these cases, the Trojan Horse mechanism may prove to be counterproductive because it may reduce significantly the conspirators' monitoring costs and would not provide sufficient incentives for any of them to file a suit. In illegal employment schemes, on the other hand, both profits and monitoring costs are relatively low, and thus the Trojan Horse mechanism may prove to be effective.
TROJAN HORSES VERSUS BOUNTY HUNTERS OR WHISTLE BLOWERS: PRINCIPAL DISTINCTIONS
On first impression, it seems that the Trojan Horse enforcement mechanism is only a unique example of a bounty hunter program. Arguably, there is nothing in Becker and Stigler's private enforcement model that denies co-conspirators the right to snitch and collect the fine. Similarly, some bounty hunter programs do not rule out the possibility of rewarding a squealing co-conspirator. But Becker and Stigler's model, as well as the prevailing bounty hunter programs, does not provide adequate incentives for co-conspirators to come forward, as they fail to take into account the Trojan Horse's significant filing costs and, more importantly, his opportunity costs. 11 Unlike bounty hunters, a Trojan Horse plaintiff waives the benefits of the illegal scheme. Hence, for the mechanism to kick in, the law must ensure the Trojan Horse a much larger reward than it provides to any other private enforcer. In fact, as shown in the case of infinite schemes, the mechanism is effective only if we allow the Trojan Horse to collect the entire fine the defendant pays.
In practice, however, even those bounty hunter programs that allow lawbreakers to squeal and collect a portion of the fine do not provide any beneficial treatment to co-conspirators. On the contrary, relative to a lawabiding squealer, co-conspirators are typically awarded a lesser portion of the fine (Ferziger and Currell, 1999) . Under these circumstances, it seems unlikely that conspirators would snitch on their partners before the police are on their trail.
11 Another important distinction between the prevailing bounty hunter programs and the mechanism this paper endorses can be found in the role played by public enforcement agencies. Whereas in this paper, the enforcement agencies stay outside of the loop, the prevailing bounty hunter programs allow regulators discretion as to whether and to what extent to reward a snitch. Thus, although some laws empower regulators to reward co-conspirators for snitching, these regulators typically refuse to do so. For an excellent review on this subject, see Ferziger and Currell, (1999) . Although one may argue, on the basis of this paper, that whistle blowers (or bounty hunters) should also be allowed to handle their cases without government intervention, I believe there are two distinctions between Trojan Horses and Whistle Blowers that may explain why government intervention is required only in the latter cases: First, whereas Trojan Horses are under pressure to bring charges before their co-conspirators, whistle blowers may have an incentive to postpone filing (see note 10). Second, unlike Trojan Horses who are co-conspirators and therefore have easy access to incriminating evidence, whistle blowers often need additional evidence that only the government may access.
TROJAN HORSES AND STATE WITNESS PROGRAMS: PRINCIPAL DISTINCTIONS
State witness programs provide amnesty to conspirators who snitch on their partners. Hence, these programs, more than bounty hunter programs, resemble the Trojan Horse mechanism. One important, institutional distinction between the Trojan Horse mechanism and amnesty programs is that amnesty programs are operated by a public enforcement agency which gets to decide whom, if anyone, to sue and to whom, if anyone, to grant immunity. The Trojan Horse mechanism, on the other hand, is monitored by courts only and is not subject to the politics of prosecutorial discretion. 12 Moreover, unlike prosecutors, whose decisionmaking processes are typically confidential, court proceedings are transparent and open to public scrutiny. Thus, criminals are more likely to trust courts.
The second distinction between the two mechanisms is that, whereas state witness programs only grant immunity from sanctions, the Trojan Horse mechanism offers a carrot as well. Thus, conspirators would approach a public enforcer and ask for immunity only after the public enforcer is on their tail; Trojan Horses, on the other hand, would file a suit even with no public enforcers around. This distinction is of particular significance in infinite schemes. To see why, consider the case of an infinite scheme in which each conspirator anticipates a stream of revenues with a net present value of G. The conspirators also know that there is a probability P that they will be detected by the public authorities and be forced to pay a fine with a net present value of F. For each conspirator, therefore, the net present value of the scheme is G-PF. As long as the net present value of the scheme is negative, public enforcement provides sufficient deterrence and there is no essential need for supplementing it with an amnesty program. The interesting case, therefore, is when the net present value of the scheme is positive, namely, when F<G/P. In such cases, it seems that an amnesty program cannot provide sufficient motivation for conspirators to snitch on one another. Even if filing costs are zero, as long as the net present value of the scheme is positive, it is worthwhile for the 12 In the U.S., the Antitrust Amnesty Program seems to come close to waiving prosecutorial discretion, as it ensures immunity to the first cartel member to come forward (DOJ Corporate Leniency Policy, 1993) . However, even this program discriminates between conspirators on "moral grounds" and would not grant immunity to "the leader in, or originator of, the activity" (Section 6 of the DOJ's policy). Such a condition undermines the efficacy of the program because the minor conspirator is never threatened by the possibility that the main wrongdoer will sue first. Moreover, since the leader knows he is subject to the risk that the minor conspirator would snitch, the leader must keep the minor profitable. Thus, the DOJ policy supports the stability of the cartel.
conspirators to continue engaging in the infinite scheme and it does not pay to squeal. Only a positive reward, like the Trojan Horse's, has the potential of tipping the scales and persuading participants in a profitable scheme to incriminate their partners. In other words, whereas amnesty programs are effective only against infinite schemes with negative net present value (NPV), the Trojan Horse mechanism deters profitable schemes as well.
OPPORTUNISM
One of the most troubling aspects of the Trojan Horse mechanism is that it might provoke opportunistic behavior. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical: The general belief among producers in a certain market is that an agreement among competitors to set quality standards does not violate the antitrust laws. Although such an agreement would clearly benefit these producers, free-riding predicaments entail that no one among them is willing to sustain the costs of initiating negotiations for such an agreement. Now suppose that one of these competitors suddenly learns about the illegality of such a standardization agreement. Assuming this informed party believes that the other producers are uninformed, the Trojan Horse enforcement mechanism might tempt that informed party to invite his naive competitors to enter into such an illegal scheme, only for the purpose of suing them thereafter. Many would find this effect troubling even if the opportunistic Trojan Horse were to file suit at the very earliest stage of the scheme, before any harm is done. Most troubling is the fact that the law puts together a mechanism that encourages otherwise law-abiding citizens to join or even initiate an illegal scheme. Arguably, they would do so for the sole purpose of filing a suit and collecting the fine from their "naive" accomplices. One comforting answer to this objection is that the risk of such opportunism is probably not significant. The models I have used above missed this point because they assumed criminals conspire contemporaneously. But a seducer must always make the first illegal move and, thus, the seducer's risk of being sued is greater than the second-mover's risk. In our price-fixing example, the knowledgeable party can rarely be sure that all his competitors are, in fact, ignorant of the illegality of the scheme. Given the fact that the seducer must make the first illegal move, he faces the risk of being sued by one of his competitors, for the mere attempt to fix prices, before he finds his way to the courthouse.
The problem of the opportunistic Trojan Horse plaintiff operates differently in asymmetric cases, like the case of the employer of illegal immigrants we discussed above. Deep-pockets have nothing to gain from entrapping judgment-proof agents in an illegal scheme. Judgment-proof felons, on the other hand, face no risk of being sued and, therefore, can only gain by seducing deep-pockets into a conspiracy. Thus, although the opportunism problem is one-sided, it may still be more prevalent in asymmetric schemes. However, one should bear in mind that typically, judgment-proof felons are also less informed then deep-pockets. Employers, for example, are typically more familiar with their legal risks and rights than (potential) illegal immigrants, who may learn about their right to sue their employer only after they immigrate and start working. Moreover, an attempt on the part of a potential illegal immigrant to seduce employers involves significant costs -traveling costs, for exampleand it is unlikely that someone would incur these costs only for the hope that he will find an uninformed employer to fall into the trap.
If, despite these two encouraging answers, we are still interested in restricting such opportunism, we can adopt a variant on the first-felon-to-file-collects-the-fine rule that would mitigate this problem. One radical solution would be to deny standing to anyone who knowingly conspires to violate the law. Under this solution, only innocent parties who realize they are engaging in illegal conduct only after it has commenced would be allowed to bring such a suit. The flaw in this solution, however, is that although it might operate effectively to deter opportunistic behavior, at the same time it would undermine the efficacy of the Trojan Horse mechanism. For example, one possible scenario would be that the briber and bribee commit not to sue one another simply by declaring, in their bribery agreement, the illegality of their interaction.
Hence, to mitigate opportunism and, at the same time, to sustain the efficacy of this mechanism, we must ignore the plaintiff's motivation and focus on the defendant's state of mind. One logical refinement would be to subject Trojan Horses to the same limitation any police informer is subject to under the entrapment doctrine. 13 Thus, the right to collect the fine would be contingent on the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate that the defendant would have engaged in the illegal scheme even without the plaintiff's involvement. Typically, such evidence is accessible in multi-party schemes like cartels or sweatshops that employ several illegal immigrants, in which the Trojan Horse will always be able to show that he did not induce the defendant to breach the law.
THE PROBLEM OF FALSE CLAIMS
Another concern the Trojan Horse mechanism provokes is that felons would file false complaints. The prize that the mechanism offers might induce felons to file false claims against innocent parties. Although I admit that the possibility of false claims is, indeed, troubling, it seems the probability of false testimony brought under a leniency program is even higher.
First, while Trojan Horse plaintiffs incur litigation costs, those who come forward and snitch in return for leniency incur no such costs, and thus their risk that the court might reject their testimony is lower. Second, unlike the Trojan Horse mechanism, the reward in leniency programs (i.e., waiver of criminal prosecution) is typically not conditioned on the outcome of the trial, and therefore the incentive to cheat is much higher.
Admittedly, the risk of a false claim is no greater and no smaller than the risk of a frivolous tort claim. But, just as this risk does not undermine the whole tort system, it should not undermine the Trojan Horse mechanism.
SUMMARY
This paper proposes a new enforcement mechanism against conspiracies, one that relies solely on the conspirators themselves. According to my proposal, the law should place conspirators in the prisoner dilemma by granting each one the right to sue the others. The first conspirator to file will collect the fine, or a portion of the fine, that the defendant pays. Using a simple model, I have analyzed the conditions under which the Trojan Horse mechanism is effective and compared its efficacy with that of alternative enforcement mechanisms such as public enforcement agencies, bounty hunters, and leniency programs. One important conclusion of this paper is that the Trojan Horse mechanism is particularly effective in asymmetric cases, where one party to the conspiracy is judgment-proof, the other is a deep-pocket, and the deep-pocket's gains from the plot are higher. In the context of such conspiracies, it is also easier to justify the Trojan Horse mechanism on moral grounds. Whereas in the bribery example, a moral argument can be brought against rewarding someone for entering into a bribery agreement,14 very few would argue that there is something immoral about illegal immigration. Accordingly, immigration law is not based on moral considerations, but on society's favoring of its own citizens over foreigners. In fact, even proponents of the criminalization of illegal immigration, prostitution, or drug-use would concede that from a moral perspective, violators of these laws are often the victims. In such cases, therefore, any legal system that would put an end to these activities without
